Sovereign Debt, Government Myopia, and the Financial Sector
建立模型分析短视政府为何仍能承诺偿还外债：贫穷时怕失去市场准入，富裕时怕冲击国内金融部门；短视程度越高，违约可能性越低，但税收扭曲和金融依赖也越大。
What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt? In this paper, we develop a model where myopic governments seek electoral popularity but can nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not default when they are poor because they would lose access to debt markets and be forced to reduce spending; they do not default when they become rich because of the adverse consequences to the domestic financial sector. Interestingly, the more myopic a government, the greater the advantage it sees in borrowing, and therefore the less likely it will be to default (in contrast to models where sovereigns repay because they are concerned about their long term reputation). More myopic governments are also likely to tax in a more distortionary way, and create more dependencies between the domestic financial sector and government debt that raise the costs of default. We use the model to explain recent experiences in sovereign debt markets.