A General Equilibrium Simulation Study of Subsidies to Municipal Expenditures
通过理论分析和模拟实验，研究取消美国联邦政府对地方政府的两种补贴（地方税抵扣和市政债券免税）对居民福利的影响，发现取消地方税抵扣能提高所有收入群体的效用，而取消市政债券免税则主要损害富人和穷人。
In the United States, local government expenditures are heavily sub- sidized through a variety of sources.This paper explores theoretically and then simulates empirically the effects of eliminating either of two federal subsidies encouraging local government expenditures: (1) income tax deductibility of local tax payments, and (2) the tax exempt status of interest on municipal bonds.We find that eliminating the deductibility of local taxes raises the utility of all income groups, and of home owners as well as of renters.Making interest on municipal bonds taxable, however, substantially hurts the very rich, who lose a tax shelter, and may hurt the very poor, who pay more for municipal services.While most people gain, the net gain is very small.