Ex‐post moral hazard in prevented planting
研究美国农业保险中预防性种植条款引发的事后道德风险，发现高保险覆盖率的农户更倾向选择预防性种植而非晚播，从而增加索赔概率。
Abstract This article analyzes the existence of moral hazard in prevented planting (PP) in the United States. The PP provision is defined as the “failure to plant an insured crop by the final planting date due to adverse events.” If the farmer decides not to plant a crop, the farmer receives a PP indemnity. Late planting (LP) is an option for farmers to plant a crop while maintaining crop insurance after the final planting date. Crop insurance may alter farmers’ behavior in selecting PP or LP and could increase the likelihood of PP claims even though farmers can choose LP. This study finds evidence that a farmer with higher insurance coverage tends to choose PP more often (ex‐post moral hazard). Spatial panel models attest to the existence of the ex‐post moral hazard in PP empirically. Empirical results show that the PP ratio has a positive relationship with insurance coverage in the case of corn production.