Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence
研究不完全竞争产品市场中经理的薪酬合同，发现战略互动导致薪酬对竞争对手绩效呈正敏感度，且竞争越激烈该敏感度越高，为相对绩效评估缺失提供了理论解释。
ABSTRACT We examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets. We show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance‐based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance. The need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance. Firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance. We find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry.