Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics
将寡头垄断结构的静态分析扩展到无限期框架，引入沉没成本和需求不确定性，基于后进先出动态假设推导出唯一的马尔可夫完美均衡，为Bresnahan和Reiss的实证分析提供了博弈论基础。
This paper extends the static analysis of oligopoly structure into an infinite-horizon setting with sunk costs and demand uncertainty. The observation that exit rates decline with firm age motivates the assumption of last-in first-out dynamics: An entrant expects to produce no longer than any incumbent. This selects an essentially unique Markov-perfect equilibrium. With mild restrictions on the demand shocks, sequences of thresholds describe firms' equilibrium entry and survival decisions. Bresnahan and Reiss' (1993) empirical analysis of oligopolists' entry and exit assumes that such thresholds govern the evolution of the number of competitors. Our analysis provides an infinite-horizon game-theoretic foundation for that structure. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.