The Effect of Information Opacity and Accounting Irregularities on Personal Lending Relationships: Evidence from Lender and Manager Co-Migration
研究了借款企业的信息环境和会计状况如何影响贷款人与经理之间的个人借贷关系，发现企业信息不透明会增加贷款人随经理迁移的概率，而会计违规则会降低该概率。
ABSTRACT We examine how personal lending relationships between lenders and managers are affected by information and accounting environments of borrowing firms. We address this question by exploring whether, following managerial turnover, lenders migrate with the manager from the firm where a relationship developed (origin firm) to the manager's new firm (destination firm). We find that the opacity of the external information environment of the destination firm significantly increases the probability of lenders' co-migration, while accounting irregularities at both the destination and origin firms decrease it. We also show that co-migration is affected by a lender's monitoring efficiency. A lender's monitoring efficiency increases its co-migration probability when a manager moves to an opaque firm, but not when she moves to a transparent one. When the destination or origin firm experiences accounting irregularities, even lenders with strong monitoring capabilities are mostly reluctant to continue their relationship with a migrating manager.