Comparing auction designs where suppliers have uncertain costs and uncertain pivotal status
研究多单位采购拍卖中市场设计如何影响投标行为，特别关注供应商可能成为关键供应商（即市场需求超过竞争对手总产能）的风险，发现限制报价为平缓形式可提高预期福利，且市场透明度增加可能提升竞争性。
Abstract We analyze how market design influences bidding in multiunit procurement auctions where suppliers have asymmetric information about production costs. Our analysis is particularly relevant to wholesale electricity markets, because it accounts for the risk that a supplier is pivotal; market demand is larger than the total production capacity of its competitors. With constant marginal costs, expected welfare improves if the auctioneer restricts offers to be flat. We identify circumstances where the competitiveness of market outcomes improves with increased market transparency. We also find that, for buyers, uniform pricing is preferable to discriminatory pricing when producers' private signals are affiliated.