Information Access, Conservation Practice Choice, and Rent Seeking in Conservation Procurement Auctions: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
通过实验室实验，研究了在保护采购拍卖中，提供环境质量信息如何影响竞拍者的实践选择和寻租行为，发现结合投标菜单格式与质量排名信息能提升拍卖绩效。
Abstract Existing research emphasizes the sensitivity of conservation auction performance and bidder behavior to auction design choices, as these auctions are not incentive compatible, meaning rent seeking must be controlled. Procuring agencies must decide how to provide bidders with information about the environmental quality of different conservation practices to manage the trade‐off between an increased probability of selecting the optimal practice and increased rent‐seeking behavior associated with this information. We use an induced‐value laboratory experiment to explore how access to quality information and variation in the bid‐submission protocol can best be combined to improve auction performance. We find that the auction performs best when a bid‐menu format, in which participants submit bids for all their practices, is combined with information about the environmental quality rank of available conservation practices.