Culture and Taxes
利用瑞士法语区和德语区市镇的文化偏好差异，通过双重差分法识别跨辖区税收竞争的存在，并构建理论模型解释税收对人均收入和居民分选的影响。
We propose a difference-in-differences strategy to identify the existence of interjurisdictional tax competition. Our strategy rests on differences between desired tax levels determined by culture-specific preferences and equilibrium tax levels determined by fiscal externalities and by preferences. While preferences differ systematically between French-speaking and German-speaking Swiss municipalities, local income tax burdens exhibit smooth spatial gradients. To qualify the empirical evidence, we develop a theoretical model of strategic tax setting by local governments that anticipate the effects of taxes on the per capita income and the median “hedonic” income, two inextricable consequences of the sorting of heterogeneous individuals.