How disability insurance reforms change the consequences of health shocks on income and employment
研究荷兰残疾保险改革如何通过强化雇主责任和监控义务，降低健康冲击后工人的残疾保险领取率并提高其就业率，对政策制定者和劳动经济学家有参考价值。
This paper examines whether Dutch disability insurance reforms have helped or hindered employment opportunities of workers that are facing unanticipated shocks to their health. An important component of the reforms was to make employers responsible for paying sickness benefits and to strengthen their sickness monitoring obligations. This may stimulate preventive and reintegration activities by firms. Using administrative data on hospitalizations, we conclude that both financial incentives and monitoring obligations have substantially lowered DI receipt and increased the employment of workers after a health shock.