STRATEGIC BIDDING AND CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION
研究了企业在采购拍卖中如何预期未来合同重新谈判，并战略性地调整分项报价以增加利润，利用佛蒙特州道路建设数据验证了投标扭曲行为。
Abstract When firms bid in procurement auctions, they take into account the likelihood of future contract renegotiations. If they anticipate that certain input quantities will change ex post, they have an incentive to strategically skew their itemized bids, thereby increasing profits for themselves and costs for the procuring agency. We develop and estimate a structural model of strategic bidding using a data set of road construction projects in Vermont. We find that bidding strategies lead to increased markups for renegotiated items and reduced markups for nonrenegotiated items, results consistent with bid‐skewing.