An Experimental Economics Investigation of the Land Value Tax: Efficiency, Acceptability, and Positional Goods
通过首个土地税经济实验，研究不同财产税制下土地所有者投资行为，发现土地税仅在37.5%的实验中提高整体福利，但参与者意外投票支持土地税，表明其效率与可接受性比传统模型更复杂。
This research offers the first economic experiment investigating the land tax, where landowners invest under different property tax regimes. A voting treatment assesses the relative acceptability of land value taxation. Results show a land tax produced greater overall welfare in only 37.5% of the experiment sessions. Systematic overinvestment arises from the positional-good characteristic of residential land investment, but this effect vanishes when the positional-good indicator is removed. The experiments show that the participants unexpectedly voted in favor of the land tax, suggesting that the efficiency and acceptability of the land tax may be more complex than in nonbehavioral economics modeling. <i></i>