AUCTION–LOTTERY HYBRID MECHANISMS: STRUCTURAL MODEL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
研究中国新车上牌中广泛采用的拍卖-抽签混合机制，通过结构模型估计参与者价值分布，发现该机制在保留83%效率和52%收入的同时，公平性比纯拍卖提升25倍。
Abstract This article studies an auction–lottery hybrid mechanism that is widely adopted in allocating new vehicle licenses in China. We characterize individuals' entry and bidding strategies in a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, structurally estimate individuals' value distribution from a data set of a Guangzhou program, and evaluate the performance of the mechanism. Based on the estimated distribution and counterfactual analysis, our study suggests that a hybrid mechanism preserves 83% efficiency and 52% of revenue, while it improves equity by 25 times compared to a pure auction. We show that allowing auction losers to participate in the lottery can further enhance the performance.