A Network Approach to Public Goods
研究了代理人通过付出成本创造非竞争性、异质性收益的公共物品问题，发现帕累托最优结果对应网络最大特征值为1，而林达尔结果与特征向量中心性成比例，为谈判和团队优化提供指导。
Suppose that agents can exert costly effort that creates nonrival, heterogeneous benefits for each other. At each possible outcome, a weighted, directed network describing marginal externalities is defined. We show that Pareto efficient outcomes are those at which the largest eigenvalue of the network is 1. An important set of efficient solutions--Lindahl outcomes--are characterized by contributions being proportional to agents' eigenvector centralities in the network. The outcomes we focus on are motivated by negotiations. We apply the results to identify who is essential for Pareto improvements, how to efficiently subdivide negotiations, and whom to optimally add to a team.