Influencing Control: Jawboning in Risk Arbitrage
研究股东通过公开活动影响已宣布并购交易条款的“积极风险套利”，发现其降低交易完成概率但提高溢价，起到治理作用，且回报高于被动套利。
ABSTRACT In an “activist risk arbitrage,” a shareholder attempts to improve terms of an announced M&A through public campaigns. Activists target deals with low premiums and those susceptible to managerial conflicts of interest, including going‐private deals and deals in which CEOs receive outsized payments. Activist arbitrageurs are associated with a significant decrease in the probability that targets will be sold to the announced bidders, and an increase in the premium paid, both ex post among surviving deals and ex ante among all deals. Activist arbitrage serves as a governance mechanism in M&A and earns higher returns than passive arbitrage.