EFFICIENT LIABILITY IN EXPERT MARKETS
研究了专家在提供服务时可能出现的两种不当行为（推荐错误治疗或诊断不努力），发现责任规则能激励有效诊断努力，但价格竞争会削弱其作用，而最低价格约束或服务义务可恢复效率。
Abstract When providing professional services, an expert may misbehave by either prescribing “wrong” treatment for consumer's problem or failing to exert proper effort to diagnose it. We show that under a range of liabilities the expert will recommend the appropriate treatment based on his private information if markups for alternative treatments are close enough; however, a well‐designed liability rule is essential for also motivating efficient diagnosis effort. We further demonstrate that unfettered price competition between experts may undermine the efficient role of liability, whereas either a minimum‐price constraint or an obligation‐to‐serve requirement can restore it.