Dividing bads under additive utilities
比较了平等主义规则和竞争规则在分配坏品（家务等）时的表现，发现竞争规则虽无嫉妒、单调且激励更好，但可能多值、不连续且难计算，因此没有规则在规范上完全占优。
We compare the Egalitarian rule (aka Egalitarian Equivalent) and the Competitive rule (aka Comeptitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) to divide bads (chores). They are both welfarist: the competitive disutility profile(s) are the critical points of their Nash product on the set of efficient feasible profiles. The C rule is Envy Free, Maskin Monotonic, and has better incentives properties than the E rule. But, unlike the E rule, it can be wildly multivalued, admits no selection continuous in the utility and endowment parameters, and is harder to compute. Thus in the division of bads, unlike that of goods, no rule normatively dominates the other.