Intergenerational altruism with future bias
研究发现利他主义的代际偏好存在未来偏差，导致代际利益冲突，并解释了现收现付养老金制度如何作为自我执行的承诺机制来增加未来养老转移支付。
We show that standard preferences of altruistic overlapping generations exhibit future bias, which involves preference reversals associated with increasing impatience. This underlies a conflict of interest between successive generations. We explore the implications of this conflict for intergenerational redistribution when there is a sequence of utilitarian governments representing living generations and choosing policies independently over time. We argue that future bias creates incentives to legislate and sustain a pay-as-you-go pension system, which every government views as a self-enforcing commitment mechanism to increase future old-age transfers.