Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: When are evolutionary models reliable?
通过连续时间实验检验协调攻击者-防御者博弈中的演化模型，发现强协调激励下行为偏离均衡，而弱协调和零协调激励下行为聚集于均衡，表明非符号保持的演化模型更符合人类行为。
This study reports a continuous-time experimental test of evolutionary models in coordinated attacker–defender games. It implements three experimental treatment conditions: one with strong coordination incentives, one with weak coordination incentives, and one with zero coordination incentives. Each treatment exhibits identical equilibrium predictions but distinct evolutionary predictions. Observed behavior was tightly clustered around equilibrium under both the zero coordination treatment and the weak coordination treatment but widely dispersed from equilibrium under the strong coordination treatment. This result was anticipated by explicitly dynamic models but not by conventional stability criteria. In contrast to the widely maintained assumption of sign-preservation, subjects frequently switched to lower earning strategies, suggesting that non-sign-preserving evolutionary models may provide a more accurate characterization of human behavior.