Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
研究了有诉求的联盟形成模型，假设代理人对其联盟产出有诉求，产出不足时由配给规则分配，该规则诱导出偏好排序并形成享乐博弈，刻画了能产生核心稳定博弈的连续配给规则。
This paper introduces a model of coalition formation with claims. It assumes that agents have claims over the outputs they could produce by forming coalitions. Outputs, insufficient to meet the claims and are rationed by a rule whose proposals of division induce each agent to rank the coalitions in which she can participate. As a result, a hedonic game of coalition formation emerges. Using resource monotonicity and consistency, we characterize the continuous rationing rules that induce hedonic games that admit core-stability.