Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
研究一个完全投入的发送者如何通过设计实验来影响集体采纳决策，在一致同意规则下比较两种说服模式（一般说服与个体说服）的最优策略。
A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasion modes. Under general persuasion, evidence presented to each voter depends on all voters' states. The sender makes the most demanding voters indifferent between decisions, while the more lenient voters strictly benefit from persuasion. Under individual persuasion, evidence presented to each voter depends only on her state. The sender designates a subgroup of rubber-stampers, another of fully informed voters, and a third of partially informed voters. The most demanding voters are strategically accorded high-quality information.