Dead Hand Proxy Puts and Hedge Fund Activism
研究了公司债务协议中的“死手代理看跌期权”条款，发现其主要用于贷款而非债券，且与对冲基金积极主义相关，能降低贷款成本并增加债券持有人财富。
We investigate the Dead Hand Proxy Put, a contractual innovation in corporate debt agreements that may impact hedge fund activism. We find the provision principally in loans, not bonds, and provide evidence linking the adoption of the provision to hedge fund activism. Furthermore, controlling for endogeneity, we find that the provision significantly reduces the cost of loans. Bondholder wealth also increases. Moreover, cross-sectional analysis of share returns reveals that the provision is positively associated with repeat banking relationships and negatively associated with free cash flow problems, suggesting a cost-benefit tradeoff.