Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
研究了一类在重复博弈中实现高效结果的筹码策略，适用于玩家类型按马尔可夫链演化的场景，对理解长期互动中的合作机制有参考价值。
We study a class of chip strategies in repeated games of incomplete information. This class generalizes the strategies studied by Möbius (2001) in the context of a favor-exchange model and the strategies studied in our companion paper Olszewski and Safronov (2017). In two-player games, if players have private values and their types evolve according to independent Markov chains, then under very mild conditions on the stage game, the efficient outcome can be approximated by chip-strategy equilibria when the discount factor tends to 1. We extend this result (assuming stronger conditions) to stage games with any number of players. Chip strategies can be viewed as a positive model of repeated interactions, and the insights from our analysis seem applicable in similar contexts, not covered by the present analysis.