A Foundation for Efficiency Wage Contracts
研究了当工人绩效只有雇主私下观察时，最优契约简化为效率工资契约：工人获得高于外部选择的工资，报告采用通过/失败形式，仅通过解雇威胁提供激励。
In many jobs, the worker generates only subjective performance measures privately observed by the employer, and contracts must rely on employer reports about these measures. This setting is a game with private monitoring, and prior work suggests that the optimal contract may be complex and non-recursive. I introduce a novel equilibrium refinement and show that the optimal contract simplifies to an efficiency wage contract: The worker receives a wage above his outside option and reports take a pass-fail form. Each report depends only on performance since the previous report, and effort incentives are provided purely through the threat of termination.