The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire
利用1854-1966年英国殖民官员和财政数据，发现庇护制下与上级有关系的总督更易晋升到高薪殖民地，但上任后提供更多税收豁免、收入更低、投资更少；废除庇护制后晋升和绩效差距消失。
I combine newly digitized personnel and public finance data from the British colonial administration for the period 1854–1966 to study how patronage affects the promotion and incentives of governors. Governors are more likely to be promoted to higher salaried colonies when connected to their superior during the period of patronage. Once allocated, they provide more tax exemptions, raise less revenue, and invest less. The promotion and performance gaps disappear after the abolition of patronage appointments. Patronage therefore distorts the allocation of public sector positions and reduces the incentives of favored bureaucrats to perform.