How Initial Conditions Can Have Permanent Effects: The Case of the Affordable Care Act
研究发现，美国《平价医疗法案》第一年出现网站故障的州，后续年份的平均保费持续偏高，这与标准战略定价模型不符，但符合价格接受行为，表明初始条件可导致持久影响甚至收敛到帕累托劣势均衡。
We document that states that experienced website glitches in the ACA’s first year faced higher average costs that persisted into future years. These dynamics are inconsistent with the standard strategic-pricing model, which requires non-localized common knowledge about market conditions, but are consistent with price-taking. Initial conditions can have a permanent effect—including convergence to a Pareto-dominated, stable equilibrium—under conditions that we show are plausible in this setting. Changing the fine from a fixed amount to a fraction of equilibrium prices increases the likelihood of reaching a Pareto-efficient equilibrium without increasing the equilibrium fine collected.