Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly: A Robust Coase Conjecture
研究了销售多种差异化产品的耐用品垄断问题，发现市场最终会出清，利润高于静态最优水平，且定价可能无效或存在交叉补贴，为科斯猜想提供了稳健性分析。
The paper analyzes a durable goods monopoly problem in which multiple varieties can be sold. A robust Coase conjecture establishes that the market eventually clears, with profits exceeding static optimal market-clearing profits and converging to this lower bound in all stationary equilibria with instantaneous price revisions. Pricing need not be efficient, nor is it minimal (equal to the maximum of marginal cost and minimal value), and can lead to cross-subsidization. Conclusions nest both classical Coasian insights and modern Coasian failures. The option to scrap products does not affect results qualitatively, but delivers a novel motive for selling high cost products.