The Role of Accounting Information in Optimal Debt Contracts with Informed Lenders
研究了当贷款人拥有可帮助借款人投资决策的私有信息时，会计信息在债务合同中的作用，发现借款人可在合同中加入会计信号来缓解贷款人私有信息的不利影响，提高投资效率。
ABSTRACT We analyze the role of accounting information in debt contracting when the lender has private information that can assist in the borrower's investment decision. The lender might have acquired private information during the due diligence process or via past lending relationships. We show that the borrower has a stronger incentive to engage in a suboptimal investment decision (i.e., asset substitution) ex post when the lender lacks incentive to truthfully reveal this information. We identify conditions under which, ex ante, the borrower can incorporate accounting signals in the debt contract to mitigate the effect of the lender's private information and improve the borrower's investment efficiency. Our analysis offers an alternative explanation for the use of performance pricing in debt contracts. JEL Classifications: G21; G32; M41; M48.