Optimal Contract Design in Residential Brokerage
研究房地产经纪人拥有私人信息时，房主如何设计佣金合同以激励经纪人获取并如实披露信息，发现固定佣金在无私人信息时最优，否则佣金应随信息变化。
Abstract We introduce a principal–agent model where a real estate agent has private information that is important for a home seller to make decisions on marketing strategies. The seller designs a commission contract that motivates the agent to acquire information and then truthfully reveal it. We find that fixed commission rates are optimal if the agent has no private information or if his private information is given. If the agent's private information is acquired endogenously, the optimal commission rate should vary with the information revealed by the agent. The varying commission rate, however, is associated with distorted decisions on marketing strategies.