Cohesive Institutions and Political Violence
利用尼日利亚地方政府收入的外生变化和民主制度数据，研究发现资源租金与冲突紧密相关，但选举产生的凝聚性制度能显著削弱这种关系，对理解资源诅咒和制度设计有参考价值。
Abstract Can revenue sharing of resource rents be a source of distributive conflict? Can cohesive institutions avoid such conflicts? We exploit exogenous variation in local government revenues and new data on local democratic institutions in Nigeria to study these questions. We find a strong link between rents and conflict. Conflicts are highly organized and concentrated in districts and time periods with unelected local governments. Once local governments are elected these relationships are much weaker. We argue that elections produce more cohesive institutions that help limit distributional conflict between groups. Throughout, we confirm these findings using individual level survey data.