Procurement with Asymmetric Information About Fixed and Variable Costs
研究采购方在不知道供应商固定和可变成本时，如何最优地分配资源和容忍组织冗余，发现动态模型中淘汰供应商代价更高，且生产波动越大代价越大。
ABSTRACT We investigate optimal rationing of resources and organizational slack when a principal procures from an agent with private information about fixed and variable costs. We study the problem in a two‐period setting with persistent types and investigate how the optimal rationing and slack depend on whether production increases or decreases over time. We find that rationing in a dynamic model with persistent types is extra costly, since the types that are eliminated in period 1 might have been attractive in period 2. The cost of rationing increases with the variability of production. If production levels are increasing (decreasing), the principal will be cautious when eliminating types with low variable (fixed) costs in period 1, since these types are particularly profitable in period 2. When production is more stable over time, harsher rationing can be applied in period 1, followed by less harsh rationing, if any, in period 2.