M Equilibrium: A Theory of Beliefs and Choices in Games
提出M均衡这一集合值解概念，整合了半个多世纪博弈实验中的经验规律，能预测观察到的选择和信念，并揭示现有模型无法预见的协调问题。
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered unrelated. M equilibrium is empirically robust and, despite being set-valued, falsifiable. Results from a series of experiments that compare M equilibrium to leading behavioral game theory models demonstrate its virtues in predicting observed choices and stated beliefs. Data from experimental games with a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and multiple M equilibria exhibit coordination problems that could not be anticipated through the lens of existing models.