Do Portfolio Manager Contracts Contract Portfolio Management?
理论预测，拥有不对称绩效合同的共同基金经理在年中业绩接近基准时，会在下半年增加投资组合风险。实证发现，绩效合同下的基准偏差会减少风险转移，且合同激励比锦标赛效应更能驱动风险行为。
ABSTRACT Most mutual fund managers have performance‐based contracts. Our theory predicts that mutual fund managers with asymmetric contracts and mid‐year performance close to their announced benchmark increase their portfolio risk in the second part of the year. As predicted by our theory, performance deviation from the benchmark decreases risk‐shifting only for managers with performance contracts. Deviation from the benchmark dominates incentives from the flow‐performance relation, suggesting that risk‐shifting is motivated more by management contracts than by a tournament to capture flows.