Manufacturer’s Quality Disclosure Strategy in a Dual-channel Supply Chain Considering the Impact of Information Acquisition
研究了双渠道供应链中品牌制造商如何通过信息获取预测消费者质量偏好，并据此制定定价与质量披露策略，发现制造商更愿意向高类型消费者披露信息，且披露意愿受非品牌产品成本影响。
This study investigated how information acquisition may influence original brand manufacturer’s pricing and quality disclosure decision in a dual-channel supply chain, which includes an external non-brand manufacturer. In this paper we assumed only the brand manufacturer has the ability to disclose quality information and can choose to predict consumers’ quality preference through information acquisition. We described the demand of brand and non-brand products and obtained the terminal pricing, and the wholesale price pricing strategy of the brand manufacturer. We also investigated how brand manufacturer’s pricing and information disclosure decision are affected by information acquisition. Our results suggest that: brand manufacturer is more willing to disclose information to high type consumers than low type consumers; the willingness of brand manufacturer to disclose information decreases with the increase of the cost of non-brand products; retailer can’t get benefit from information acquisition, and the impact of information acquisition on brand manufacturer is related to market capacity; compared with non-acquisition, brand manufacturer will be more willing to disclose to high type consumers under information acquisition, while the willingness to disclose to the low type consumers is related to the market capacity.