Optimal Taxation of Robots
研究机器人、其他资本和劳动收入的最优税收，发现扭曲机器人采用是最优的，机器人税或补贴通过一般均衡效应压缩工资，减少劳动供给的税收扭曲，从而提高福利。校准模型显示，机器人昂贵时补贴最优，便宜时征税最优，但改革现有税制时，调整所得税即可获得大部分福利收益，单独对机器人征税的额外收益几乎为零。
Abstract I study the optimal taxation of robots, other capital, and labor income. I show that it is optimal to distort robot adoption. The robot tax (or subsidy) exploits general-equilibrium effects to compress wages, which reduces income-tax distortions of labor supply, thereby raising welfare. In the calibrated model, when robots are expensive, a robot subsidy is optimal. As robots get cheaper, it becomes optimal to tax them. Yet, when reforming the status-quo tax system, most welfare gains can be achieved by adjusting the income tax. The additional gains from taxing robots differently from other equipment capital are close to zero.