Strategically Simple Mechanisms
定义了“策略简单性”这一机制属性，指在策略简单机制中，代理人只需基于一阶信念和理性确定性即可做出最优选择，无需高阶信念。所有占优策略机制都是策略简单的，但更多机制（如双边贸易和投票问题中的机制）也满足此性质，且更灵活。
We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call “strategic simplicity,” and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if choices can be based on first‐order beliefs about the other agents' preferences and first‐order certainty about the other agents' rationality alone, and there is no need for agents to form higher‐order beliefs, because such beliefs are irrelevant to the optimal strategies. All dominant strategy mechanisms are strategically simple. But many more mechanisms are strategically simple. In particular, strategically simple mechanisms may be more flexible than dominant strategy mechanisms in the bilateral trade problem and the voting problem.