Accountability, Political Capture, and Selection Into Politics: Evidence from Peruvian Municipalities
研究了当问责机制易被政治俘获时，政治问责如何影响从政者筛选。通过比较秘鲁城市中罢免公投成功与失败地区的候选人特征，发现罢免前任官员会导致候选人教育水平、经验降低，且对土著群体的代表性减弱。
Abstract We estimate the effects of political accountability on the selection of politicians when accountability mechanisms are prone to political capture. We compare the characteristics of candidates running in municipalities where the previous incumbent was ousted from office through a recall referendum with those who run where the recall referendum failed by a small margin. Having a recalled incumbent in the previous term causes a negative selection of candidates in terms of their education and previous experience. They are also less representative of indigenous groups. The results are driven by localities where the accountability institution is likely used for political purposes.