How Do Central Bank Governors Matter? Regulation and the Financial Sector
研究了1970-2011年间全球央行行长的职业背景对金融监管放松程度的影响，发现具有金融部门经历的行长在任期内推动的放松监管力度是无金融经历行长的三倍。
Abstract Do past employment characteristics of central bank governors affect financial regulation? To answer this question, we construct a new data set based on curriculum vitae of all central bank governors around the world in 1970–2011. We interpret work experiences as indicators of preferences toward deregulation. Over the average duration in office (5.6 years), a governor with financial sector experience is associated with three times more deregulation than a governor without experience in finance. Similar results hold for past experience at the IMF; in contrast, past experience at the BIS and the UN are associated with less deregulation.