An Estimable Model of Income Redistribution in a Federation: Musgrave Meets Oates
研究了联邦制下个人税收导致跨境收入转移的理论，估计了加拿大税收分权改革中避税和税基转移的弹性，讨论了最优联邦税制设计。
We develop a theory of cross-border income shifting in response to subnational personal taxation in a federation and examine its implications for the excess burden of personal taxes. We show how a properly chosen federal tax rate can offset the fiscal externality between states and facilitate decentralization, even in a heterogeneous federation where unitary taxation is suboptimal. Optimal taxes depend on the elasticities of national tax avoidance and of cross-state tax base shifting. We estimate these elasticities around a tax decentralization reform in Canada, finding both to be empirically relevant. We discuss the implications for optimal federalism.