Consequences of Debt Forgiveness: Strategic Default Contagion and Lender Learning
利用小企业贷款数据，研究发现贷款人给予债务减免后，借款人之间会传播信息，导致更多策略性违约，违约率平均上升10.9%，且贷款人通过收紧减免政策来应对。
ABSTRACT I use a unique data set of loans to small business owners to examine whether lenders face adverse consequences when they grant debt forgiveness to borrowers. I provide evidence consistent with borrowers communicating their debt forgiveness to other borrowers, who then more frequently strategically default on their own obligations. This strategic default contagion is economically large. When the lender doubles debt forgiveness, the default rate increases by 10.9% on average. Using an exogenous shock to the lender's forgiveness policy, my findings suggest that as the lender learns about the extent of borrower communication the lender tightens its debt forgiveness policy to mitigate default contagion.