Do Employees’ Sickness Absences React to a Change in Costs for Firms? Evidence from a Natural Experiment*
研究一项社会保险改革如何影响员工病假：改革取消了企业为蓝领工人支付的强制性保险，导致病假次数减少约6.3%，病假天数减少约8.6%，且未发现对白领工人的溢出效应。
Abstract We analyse the impact of a social security reform that changed the costs incurred by firms due to sickness absences. The reform abolished a compulsory insurance for firms, which insured them against the wages paid to sick blue‐collar workers. During the first year after its introduction, we estimate that the reform resulted in about 6.3 percent fewer sickness absences, and in about 8.6 percent fewer absence days. We do not find evidence for changes in hiring or firing, and we find only limited workforce composition changes. We do not find spillover effects on the absences of white‐collar workers. Robustness checks confirm these results.