Information Design in the Holdup Problem
研究买方自主选择估值分布时，卖方在观察分布后出价的双边贸易模型，发现无成本分布下均衡价格和双方收益均为1/e，且分布产生单位弹性需求，事后交易有效。
We analyze a bilateral trade model where the buyer chooses the distribution of her valuation for the good. The seller, after observing the buyer’s distribution but not the realized valuation, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If distributions are costless, the price and the payoffs of both the buyer and the seller are shown to be 1/e in the unique equilibrium outcome. The buyer’s equilibrium distribution generates a unit-elastic demand, and trade is ex post efficient. These properties are shown to be preserved even when different distributions are differentially costly as long as the cost is monotone in the dispersion of the distribution.