Leader Identity and Coordination
通过在印度进行的协调博弈实验，研究领导者宗教身份对政策效果的影响，发现少数群体领导者能改善协调，但平权政策会逆转这一效果，而群体间接触则提升两类领导者的有效性。
Abstract This paper examines policy effectiveness as a function of leader identity. We experimentally vary leader religious identity in a coordination game implemented in India and focus on citizen reactions to leader identity, controlling for leader actions. We find that minority leaders improve coordination, and majority leaders do not. Alternative treatment arms reveal that affirmative action for minorities reverses this result, while intergroup contact improves the effectiveness of leaders of both identities. We also find that minority leaders are less effective in towns with a history of intergroup conflict. Our results demonstrate that leader and policy effectiveness depend on citizen reactions, conditioned by social identity and past conflict.