MONOPOLY INSURANCE AND ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION
研究了垄断保险市场中消费者通过努力选择内生获取信息的问题，发现均衡时所有合同都提供不足额保险以抑制信息收集，且降低信息成本可能损害双方利益。
Abstract We study a monopoly insurance model with endogenous information acquisition. Through a continuous effort choice, consumers can determine the precision of a privately observed signal that is informative about their accident risk. The equilibrium effort is, depending on parameter values, either zero (implying symmetric information) or positive (implying privately informed consumers). Regardless of the nature of the equilibrium, all offered contracts, also at the top, involve underinsurance, which discourages information gathering. We identify a missorting effect that explains why the insurer wants to discourage information acquisition. Moreover, lower information gathering costs can hurt both consumer and insurer.