Upstream Bundling and Leverage of Market Power
研究了多产品上游企业通过捆绑垄断产品与竞争产品，降低竞争对手向零售商支付进场费的意愿，为Google-Android案提供了理论解释。
Abstract We present a novel rationale for bundling in vertical relations. In many markets, upstream firms compete to be in the best downstream slots (e.g., the best shelf in a retail store or the default application on a platform). If a multi-product upstream firm faces competition for a subset of its products, we show that tying the monopolised product with the competitive ones can reduce upstream rivals’ willingness to offer slotting fees to retailers. This strategy does not rely on entry deterrence and can be achieved through contractual or even virtual tying. The model is particularly relevant to the Google-Android case.