Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
针对现实中同时存在道德风险和逆向选择的委托代理问题，提出一种名为“解耦”的简单方法，可同时分析两种摩擦，并给出解耦有效的检验条件与算法。
While many real-world principal-agent problems have both moral hazard and adverse selection, existing tools largely analyze only one at a time. Do the insights from the separate analyses survive when the frictions are combined? We develop a simple method—decoupling—to study both problems at once. When decoupling works, everything we know from the separate analyses carries over, but interesting interactions also arise. We provide simple tests for whether decoupling is valid. We develop and numerically implement an algorithm to calculate the decoupled solution and check its validity. We also provide primitives for decoupling to work and analyze several extensions.