Tax avoidance, financial experts on the audit committee, and business strategy
研究了审计委员会中的财务专家如何根据企业战略（防御型或探索型）调整对税务筹划的监督，发现他们对防御型企业鼓励更多避税，对探索型企业则相反。
Abstract We examine whether financial expert audit committee members tailor their approach to overseeing the corporate tax planning process according to the firm's business strategy. We predict and find that such directors encourage defender‐type firms (characterized partially by high risk aversion) to engage in more tax avoidance activities and prospector‐type firms (characterized partially by innovation and risk seeking) to scale back on tax avoidance, relative to the opposing strategy type. We also find that both accounting experts and non‐accounting financial experts on the audit committee contribute to our results to some extent, although the effects of non‐accounting financial experts present more consistently. Overall, our results suggest that financial experts on the audit committee tend to play more of an advising role for defenders and more of a monitoring role for prospectors, relative to one another.