Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda
通过实验改变预期收入，研究金钱激励如何影响求职者对岗位特征的认知，进而影响应聘者数量、构成及后续绩效，发现高薪岗位会降低社区正外部性感知，并排斥亲社会动机强的应聘者。
I study the role of financial incentives as signals of job characteristics when these are unknown to potential applicants. To this end, I create experimental variation in expected earnings and use that to estimate the effect of financial incentives on candidates’ perception of a brand-new health-promoter position in Uganda and on the resulting size and composition of the applicant pool. I find that more lucrative positions are perceived as entailing a lower positive externality for the community and discourage agents with strong pro-social preferences from applying. While higher financial incentives attract more applicants and increase the probability of filling a vacancy, the signal they convey reduces the ability to recruit the most socially motivated agents, who are found to stay longer on the job and to perform better.