Fight or Flight: Endogenous Timing in Conflicts
研究双方在争夺奖品时，根据自身实力强弱选择战斗、逃跑或等待的动态博弈，发现威慑价值决定均衡类型，并通过实验验证了理论预测。
Abstract We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a “deterrence value” on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We show that this value is a key determinant of the type of equilibrium. For intermediate values, sorting takes place, with weaker players fleeing before others fight. Time then helps to reduce battles. In an experiment, we find support for the key theoretical predictions and document suboptimal predatory fighting.