Political and Institutional Determinants of Credit Booms
研究了政治因素和中央银行独立性对信贷繁荣的影响，发现右翼执政和政治不稳定会降低信贷繁荣概率，而央行独立性也有抑制作用。
Abstract The literature that investigates credit booms has essentially focused on their economic determinants. This paper explores the importance of political conditionings and central bank independence and provides some striking findings on this matter. Estimating a fixed effects logit model over a panel of developed and developing countries for the period 1975q1–2016q4, we find that credit booms are less likely when right‐wing parties are in office, especially in developing countries, and when there is political instability. However, they have not proven to depend on the electoral cycle. More independent Central Banks are also found to reduce the probability of credit booms. Moreover, they seem to be more likely to occur and spread within a monetary union.